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QUESTIONING THE POWER OF
CONSUMERISM TO REFORM PUBLIC
EDUCATION
MOLLY TOWNES O'BRIENt
Legend has it that as the people were rioting in the streets in
Parisjust before the FrenchRevolution, Marie Antoinette turned to
her assistant and asked, "What is wrong? Why are the people
fighting in the streets?" "They have no bread to eat, your majesty"
came the response. "No bread?" gasped Marie. "Let them eat
cake."'
INTRODUCTION
The goals of current initiatives for private school tuition
vouchers are lofty: academic excellence, economic efficiency,
intellectual and spiritual liberty, and equity. A voucher system,
it is argued, would introduce market competition into schooling
and would result in increased efficiency and higher student
achievement. 2 Moreover, vouchers would increase parental
control over their children's education, giving families more
educational flexibility and more intellectual and spiritual
liberty.3 Further, a voucher system could improve educational
equity by giving poor children educational options that are
currently only available to wealthier families. 4 Finally, even if
t LL.M., Temple University; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law; A.B.,
Brown University. Associate Professor of Law at University of Akron School of Law.
1 The story is said to have originated with Jean Jacques Rousseau in his
Confessions, Book 6 (1782) and is generally understood to be fictional.
2 See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1990); Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 47, 49-50, 53 (1998).
3 See JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE
CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 52-61 (1978); see also Rosemary Salomone, Struggling
With the Devil: A Case Study of Values in Conflict, 32 GA. L. REV. 633

(1998) (describing that values of religious families conflict with public school
agendas).
4 See JOSEPH P. VITERITTI,

CHOOSING EQUALITY:

CONSTITUTION AND CIVI SOCIETY (1999).
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vouchers cannot deliver all of the expected benefits, at least they
will do no harm and, given the poor state of public schooling,
should be tried.5 Faced with the seemingly intractable problems
of urban public schools-poverty, racial segregation, low
achievement-school voucher advocates propose to give parents
tuition vouchers to allow them to purchase their children's escape
from failing public schools. Let them attend private schools, they
say.
If a reform in the method of financing public education could
advance the important goals of excellence, efficiency, liberty, and
equality, then certainly it would be worth trying. What could be
the harm?
In the short space I have here, my task is to cast a skeptical
eye on the prospects of school reform through tuition vouchers
and to illuminate what I perceive to be some of the potential
harms of moving to a voucher system for funding public
education. Of course, the issues are complex and any specific
voucher plan may be configured in a way that will change the
values implications of the proposal. Nevertheless, I contend that
the method of reform envisioned by voucher advocates, that is,
market reform based on consumer choice in education, will
facilitate academic credentialing and the individual pursuit of
education for advantage while it undermines progress toward
educational equity. It may also have serious unintended effects on
individual intellectual and spiritual liberty. Consumer sovereignty
is unlikely to alleviate the serious difficulties facing urban public
education. Resting on false assumptions about the availability of
choices and the dynamics of school attendance in urban systems,
tuition voucher initiatives promise to distract attention from some
of the problems facing public education and exacerbate others.

5 See Stephen D. Sugarman, Part of the Solution Rather than Part of the
Problem: A Role for American Private Elementary and Secondary Schools in the
1990s, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681, 693-700 (1990) (arguing that vouchers could
provide immediate benefits and will not create new harms and should therefore be

tried).
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I.

POTENTIAL HARM #1

Voucher programswill be expensive and are not likely to
yield the expected gains in student achievement and school
administrativeefficiency.
Arguments favoring tuition vouchers are often premised on
the expectation that private schools will improve student
achievement. There is, however, surprisingly little evidence that
private schooling results in higher educational achievement.
Recent empirical studies comparing traditional public schools to
choice schools reveal either no differences or minimal differences
in student academic achievement. 6 Extensive analysis of the
Milwaukee voucher program has yielded results suggesting
marginal, if any, improvement in academic performance among
students who accepted private school vouchers. 7 The more
salient factors in determining student achievement are the
socioeconomic status (SES) of the student body, school resources,
and student selection.8 The available evidence predicts that a
given student moving from the public to private sector would be
expected to achieve higher test scores and be more likely to
graduate from high school and from college, if the student moved
to a school with higher SES classmates-even if there were no
difference in the quality of instructions between the two schools. 9
6

See Henry M. Levin, Educational Vouchers: Effectiveness, Choice, and Costs,

17 J. POL'Y ANAL. MGMT. 375-79 (1998) (reviewing the results of major empirical
studies of public/private school achievement); See also Dan D. Goldhaber, School
Choice: An Examination of the Empirical Evidence on Achievement, Parental
Decision Making, and Equity, 28 EDUC. RESEARCHER 16-25 (1999) (reviewing

quantitative assessments of the impact of choice on educational outcomes); cf
JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS (1987)

(arguing that private Catholic schools have positive effect on achievement); see also
Levin, supra at 378-79 (comparing educational attainment of urban minority
students at public and Catholic schools and suggesting that the Catholic school
students had higher graduation rates, higher rates of college attendance, and higher
college graduation rates than their public school counterparts).
7

See JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION (2000) (analyzing

the results of the Milwaukee voucher experiment and concluding that there is no
consistent and reliable evidence that vouchers produced higher student
achievement). But see Jay P. Greene et al., School Choice in Milwaukee: A
Randomized Experiment, in

PAUL E. PETERSON & BRYAN C. HASSEL EDS.,

LEARNING FROM SCHOOL CHOICE 342-51 (1998) (suggesting that students accepting
vouchers and remaining in voucher schools demonstrated improved performance in
reading and math).
8 See Goldhaber, supra note 6, at 20.
9 See id.
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On the other hand, if the socioeconomic demographics of a given
private school begin to look more like the public schools,
achievement gains will no longer result from moving from one
system to the other. 10
Voucher advocates have often argued that, even if public
and private schools provide comparable student achievement
levels, private schools operate more efficiently than public
schools. Private school tuition is often lower than the per pupil
expenditure
at comparably achieving public schools."
Comparing public school expenditures to private school tuition,
however, is not a valid approach to assessing the relative costs of
public and private schools. 12 Henry Levin, Professor of Higher
Education and Economics at Stanford University, explains that
private school tuition does not measure the full cost of private
schools, which supplement tuition with fund-raising events,
special student fees, financial contributions and in-kind
contributions. 13 Further, in calculating per pupil expenditures,
public schools include the cost of providing special educational
services for students with disabilities, vocational education,
transportation and food services, none of which are usually
included in the cost of private school tuition. 14
Even if private schools do currently operate more efficiently
than public schools, the gains in school efficiency that are
expected to flow from the market competition among public and
private schools are unlikely to be realized. This is so, in part,
because parents are not likely to select a cheaper school over a
more expensive one. Parents are likely to select a school for the
prestige of the school's academic credential and its ability to
provide their children upward social mobility and to guard them
against downward social mobility.15 Education is frequently
10 See id.

11 See Levin, supra note 6, at 383 (citing inter alia David Boaz & R. Morris
Barrett, What Would a School Voucher Buy? The Real Cost of PrivateSchools, Cato
Briefing Paper No. 25 (1996)).
12 See id. at 383.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See David Hogan, "To Better Our Condition:"EducationalCredentialingand
"the Silent Compulsion of Economic Relations" in the United States, 1830 to the
Present, 36 HIST. EDUC. Q. 243, 253-57 (1996). Other factors, such as minority
enrollment, religious preference, convenience, and proximity to home or work, have
been shown to play a major role in determining how parents exercise school choices.
See Kevin B. Smith & Kenneth J. Meier, School Choice: Panaceaor Pandora'sBox,
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valued for the status it confers rather than for its intrinsic
value. 16 The available sociological data suggests that parents
choose a school, in part, to place their child "not in the right kind
of program, but with the right kind of children."1 7 Further,
schools do not necessarily compete by becoming more efficient,
but rather, by adding programs, increasing endowment, and
improving reputation. A school's reputation may be dependent
on factors having more to do with the wealth of the school and
the exclusivity of its admissions process than with the quality of
the classroom teaching. Parents, who must often make choices
based on limited information, are not "education consumers," but
rather consumers of school program brochures, test scores,
building and grounds appearance, and elite reputations.' 8
If public money is made available to private schools that
have been operating with only minimal public subsidy, the total
cost of education at these institutions is likely to rise. In a
society where property and educational credentials together
define an "individual's class,"19 some parents with disposable
income will still pay tuition above the subsidized amount of a
voucher to buy not only an academic, but also a social advantage
for their children. As wealthier parents use their voucher to
20
place their children in even more expensive private schools,

77 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 315-16 (1995).
16 See Smith & Meier, supra note

15, at 312 (arguing that academic

achievement had no measurable impact on private school enrollment).
17 Carol Ascher, Retravelling the Choice Road, 64 HARV. EDUC. REV. 209, 216

(1994).
18 See Amy S. Wells, African-AmericanStudents' View of School Choice, in WHO
CHOOSES? WHO LOSES? CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF

SCHOOL CHOICE 32-38 (Bruce Fuller & Richard F. Elmore eds., 1996) (describing
what parents looked at to determine which school was a "better" school). But see
WITTE, supra note 7, at 62-73 (describing the reasons that parents gave for
selecting a particular school, including "educational quality," "teaching approach,"
"discipline," and "general atmosphere of the school").
19 See WITTE, supra note 7, at 254.

20 This phenomenon has long been present in American schooling-

The financial resources of the middle class, their greater demand for the
consumption of benefits of education, and their resistance to the downward
mobility their children would suffer if they did not attain a high education
level complement a probable tendency for the financial rate of return to
their education to exceed that of the lower class. The overall result is a
definite expected class bias in private education demands-an expectation
that is fully supported by the statistics of class differences among families
in educational investment.
JOHN D. OWEN, SCHOOL INEQUALITY AND THE WELFARE STATE 69 (1974).
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private voucher schools and public schools will either lose ground
in a competitive marketplace, or require additional funding to
remain competitive. The new infusion of capital into private
21
schools puts public schools at a competitive disadvantage.
Rather than resulting in economic savings and improved
efficiency, implementation of a voucher system will subsidize the
middle and upper class pursuit of educational advantage and
contribute to the escalation of the public costs of schooling.
Vouchers add to the administrative burden of public education
and increase the total public cost of education. Professor Levin
estimates that the added cost of a voucher system-which
includes: accommodating the additional students who are now in
private schools, 22 keeping records of voucher payments,
monitoring voucher schools, providing transportation to voucher
schools, providing information for parents to make informed
choices, and adjudicating disputes related to voucher school
placement-would total almost $73 billion, or an additional
twenty-five percent of the public education budget. 23

H. POTENTIAL HARM #2
A.

Voucher programswill facilitate choices made on the basis of
bias and elitism and will result in greaterracialand
economic segregationof schooling and society.
Although many of the scholars who have endorsed private
school tuition vouchers cite the potential benefits of market
competition as a reason to move to a voucher system, the
scholastic and economic benefits of moving to a voucher system
are speculative at best. Market theory, however, has provided a
respectable intellectual framework for arguments that might
21 See Goldhaber, supra note 6, at 23-24 (noting the lack of empirical data
showing the institutional response of public schools to the competitive threat of
losing students and funding); see also Eric Rofes, How are School Districts
Responding to Charter Laws and Charter Schools? (April 1998) (describing the
complex effects on public schools that result when disgruntled parents remove their
children from the school).
22 When vouchers were made available to pay for private, parochial education
in Cleveland, approximately 75% of the voucher recipients had been enrolled in the
parochial schools before the advent of the voucher program. Proposition 38, defeated
in California in November 2000, would have given $4000 to the parents of each
private school student, including children of affluent families already enrolled in
private school.
23 See Levin, supra note 6, at 385-87.
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otherwise be viewed as undermining an important American
tradition in the name of self-interest. 24
Although the
contemporary private school voucher debate is frequently said to
have been sparked by the writing of Nobel Laureate Milton
Friedman,25 the first state law providing for private school
tuition vouchers in this country was not the brain-child of the
free market economist Milton Friedman, but was instead the
invention of a southern racist politician, Roy Harris. In 1950,
Harris, a demagogue, behind-the-scenes power broker and editor
of his own newspaper, responded to the looming threat of courtordered school desegregation in Georgia, writing, "If the public
school system is to mean the destruction of the pattern of
segregation, then we ought to do away with the public school
system and devise another to take its place."26 Harris predicted
that if the public schools were ordered to desegregate, whites
and industry would leave the central cities and whites would
stop taxing themselves to support public education, eventually
placing their children in private schools.27 In the succeeding
months and years, private school tuition statutes designed to
avoid school desegregation were enacted and, after being in
operation for several years, were ruled unconstitutional in
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Virginia.2 8 Georgia's

24

See Molly Townes O'Brien, PrivateSchool Tuition Vouchers and the Realities

of Racial Politics, 64 TENN L. REV. 359, 363 (1997); see also JEFFREY R. HENIG,
RETINING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR 189 (1994)

(stating that "the market overlay provides a sheen of intellectual rigor, the reflected
stature of economic theory, and an opportunity to gain financial support from
corporations, foundations, and grant-giving agencies that otherwise have shown
indifference toward [choice] initiatives").
25 Milton Friedman is the Nobel Laureate who is frequently credited with
kindling modem interest in privatization of public schools. See id; see also
VITERITTI, supra note 4, at 54 (claiming that Friedman anticipated not only the
voucher debate but also the rise of private entrepreneurs in education).
26 O'Brien, supra note 24, at 384 (quoting Roy V. Harris, Strictly Personal,
AUGUSTA COURIER, Oct. 9, 1950). Harris' declaration was four years before Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and five years before Milton Friedman
first wrote about vouchers.
27 See O'rien, supranote 24, at 384.
28 See Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969);
Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969); Brown v. South
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C.), affd per curiam, 393 U.S.
222 (1968); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n., 275 F. Supp. 833
(E.D. La. 1967), affld, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F.
Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
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voucher statute, enacted in 1953,29 has not been funded since
1961, but is still on the books in Georgia and was recently the
30
focus of an unsuccessful lawsuit seeking to require full funding.
Meanwhile, the racism that fueled white residential,
commercial and industrial flight from our central cities
continues to play a major role in the persisting inequity in our
American public schooling.31 White racism, both intentional and
unconscious, and the African American struggle against racism
have been key factors in both the historical development of
American education and contemporary dissatisfaction with it.32
Vouchers will facilitate the long-term trend toward self33
segregation based on race.
B. Even if vouchers are given only to poor children in the worst
schools, private school tuition vouchers will exacerbaterather
than cure the existing inequity in public schooling.
We know that individual parental demand for education of
his or her own child is already an important force in the
distribution of educational resources in this society and is
"certainly the key factor in explaining schooling inequities."34
Some of the most interesting voucher proposals are those that
seek to use vouchers as a redistributive force, giving poor
families increased choices and improving educational equity
across race and class lines. This "second generation of policy
proposals," which claim the work of Ted Sizer, Christopher
Jencks, John Coons and Stephen Sugarman as their intellectual
29 See 1953 Ga. Laws 24 (proposing state constitutional amendment to provide
grants for private educational purposes).
30 See Lowe v. Georgia, 482 S.E.2d 344 (1997) (stating that mandamus not
available to compel state to fund Tuition Grant Act).
31 See Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation:African Americans, Latinos,

and Unequal Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL

OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996).
32 See THOMAS V. OBRIEN, THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SCHOOLING (1999)
[hereinafter THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SCHOOLING]; see also OBrien, supra note
26 at 374, 376, 405 (describing white resistance to providing education for
minorities, the role of education in maintaining a status of "advantage," and the role
that race plays in the unwillingness of fiscal conservatives to support public services
in general and public education in particular).
3 See THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SCHOOLING, supra note 32; see also O'Brien,
supra note 24, at 403 (discussing reasons why parents who do not consider
themselves to be racist may nonetheless choose to send their children to majoritywhite schools).
34 See OWEN, supra note 20, at 59-66.
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progenitors, 35 seek to improve equality of educational
opportunity by giving poor families options that more closely
resemble the choices available to the middle class. 36 Voucher
programs passed in the 1990s in Wisconsin, Ohio, and Florida
with the endorsement of diverse constituencies of whites, blacks,
conservatives, and liberals claim to be designed to provide relief
37
for students at "failing schools."
The theory behind redistributive voucher proposals is that
they will put poor families in the market position of their
wealthier middle-class counterparts. Given the ability to pay
tuition at private schools, poor families, whose children are
currently "trapped" in inadequate urban schools, will create a
demand for high quality urban schools. 38 This demand will
stimulate supply, inducing innovative entrepreneurs to open new
schools, and create competition that will stimulate reform in the
public sector.39 Although it is too early to make judgments about
the real-world operation of these "second generation" voucher
programs, it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider the
experience of one such program.
Florida recently adopted a statewide redistributive voucher
program. 40 Under the newly enacted Florida voucher program,
schools all over the state were tested with the Florida
Comprehensive Assessment Test (F-CAT).4 1 The schools that
had the lowest scores were deemed to be "failing schools" and
were given an F. 42 The Florida law provides that vouchers be
given to each child attending a school that received a grade of F
for two consecutive years. The $3,000.00 voucher could be
applied to private school tuition. Alternatively, the child could
43
attend a different public school in another district.
The A.A. Dixon and Spencer Bibbs Advanced Learning
Academy schools were the first two schools to be identified as

35 VTrERITTI, supra note 4, at 209-10.

36 Id. at 211.
37 Id. at 209.
38 Id. at 214-17.
39 Id.
40 See MICHAEL MINTROM, POLICY ENTREPRENEURS AND SOCIAL CHOICE 34

(2000).
41 See Kelly Cohen, Will Opportunity Scholarships Make the Grade: An

Examination of School Vouchers, 24 NOVA L. REV. 469,474 n.36 (1999).
42 See id. at 474.
43 See id.
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failing. 4 These schools have ninety-six percent black enrollment
and free lunch participation. 45 The schools are two of the poorest
and least racially diverse in Escambia County. 46 Dixon enrolls
children from four public housing projects. Bibbs is located in a
neighborhood of "dilapidated rental houses interspersed with
47
some better kept but humble homes."
In general, schools in Florida's wealthy neighborhoods
earned A's and B's on the F-CAT test while schools in poor
neighborhoods earned D's and F's. Although all of the children
in the two schools judged to be failing were offered a voucher,
only 138 of 876 children left Bibbs and Dixon schools. 48 Fiftyeight children enrolled in private sectarian schools 49 and as of
50
May 5th of this year, fifty-two remain in private schools.
Ninety-two children applied in all, but there were only sixty
seats available in the participating private sectarian schools.5 1
Seventy-eight children went to schools in other districts.5 2 But,
the vast majority of parents decided to let their children stay in
53
the schools that had been judged failures.
Why would they do that? Did they not care about their
children's education? Did they think their children might not
receive a better education somewhere else? Why would a parent
choose to allow a child to remain in a failing school?
I do not have access to the actual reasons for the parents'
decisions, but I will venture to speculate a bit. The concept of
school "choice" implies the power to select among viable
alternatives. For most of the families, a $3000 voucher did not
provide a viable alternative. There may be several reasons.
First, there were not enough seats available in the existing

44 See A+ PlanAlready Getting Good Results, TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 5, 2000, at

16.
45 See Heidi Hall, Humiliated But Defiant, Two "F" Schools Fight On, SUNSENTINEL, Mar. 5, 2000, at 1A.
46

See id.

47 See id.
48 See Steven Hegarty,

Study Doesn't Back Voucher Exodus Fear, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 11, 1999, at lB.
49 See id.
50 See Steven Hegarty, Scores Up In Two of the Three R"s, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May 9, 2001, at IA.
51 See Hall, supranote 45, at 1A.
52 See id.
53 See Steven Hegarty, Day One For Vouchers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 19,
1999, at lB.
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nearby private schools to accommodate all of the children
enrolled at Dixon and Bibb schools. 54 Rather than encountering
competition for their voucher money, most parents learned that
there was a notable lack of interest in it. 5 Successful private
schools are fully enrolled and not likely to compete for the
attendance of large numbers of society's poorest children.
Neither is it likely that the vouchers will stimulate the
establishment of new schools for these children. The amount of
a tuition voucher--even if funded at the full per-pupil
expenditure level-would not be sufficient to support the
additional capital outlay necessary to build new schools. Even if
funding for new private schools were available, savvy
entrepreneurs are more likely to establish schools in wealthier
56
areas and to compete for the attendance of wealthier students.
Second, many parents may have been reluctant to send their
child to a school in another district. Use of a voucher that
requires a child to travel to another neighborhood places an
additional burden on the child, both in terms of travel time and
in terms of proximity to family, friends and culturally familiar
situations. 57 The parents of the children at Dixon and Bibbs
schools may not have agreed that the schools were failing. In
fact, looking at the progress of the children in those schools from
year-to-year, the children who attended the Dixon and Bibbs
schools were gaining more than a year's reading achievement for
every year they were in school. 58 The F-CAT standardized test
results are an imperfect measure of school success or failure.
The test results do not identify the reasons for each child's poor
score; they do not identify the problems within the
administration of the school, nor do they identify which teachers

4Hall, supra note 45, at 1A.

5 The Florida experience is consistent with the voucher experiment in
Milwaukee, where few new private schools entered the market. See WITrE, supra
note 7, at 55-56.
5S Consider the experience of our society with our most widespread voucher
program: food stamps. The fact that food stamps are given to poor families has not
created excellent grocery shopping in poor neighborhoods. I thank Professor John
Zimmerman for this analogy.
57 See Amy S. Wells,African-AmericanStudents' View of School Choice, in WHO
CHOOSES? WHO LOSES? CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF

SCHOOL CHOICE 25-49 (Bruce Fuller & Richard F. Elmore eds., 1996) (describing
the burdens on individual students from urban minority neighborhoods who

attended suburban, majority white schools).
68 See Hall, supra note 45, at IA.
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are delivering high quality instruction and which are not. 59
Finally, there may have been some parents of children at Dixon
and Bibbs schools who-for any number of reasons-were not
60
capable of making a choice to send the child to another school.
In the final analysis, for the seven hundred and thirty-eight out
of eight hundred and seventy children who remained in the
61
"failing" public school, the voucher failed to provide real choice.
Ultimately, providing choices in education is an unrealistic
goal. It underestimates the size of the task and overestimates
the political will of the majority to provide an excellent education
for all children. Providing a free universal public education is a
tremendous job. There are now over 49 million children enrolled
in public schools, with diverse backgrounds, differing language
abilities, and differing physical and mental abilities. The real
challenge is to provide at least one excellent educational
opportunity for each child, not choices, not options, but at least
one high quality opportunity. As Professor Martha Minnow said
recently, "The goal is not to get every kid into a private school,
but to make all schools the kinds of places that give every kid the
62
best possible fighting chance."
Although free universal education was the vision of some of
the nation's founders and the dream of the common school
59 This is just the beginning of a long list of important educational matters that
are not measured by standardized tests. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST
(1999) (describing a social history and analysis of standardized testing in the U.S.);
see also ALFIE KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE (1999) (describing

high quality education in terms other than those measured by standardized tests).
60 Many impoverished areas have high levels of homelessness, illiteracy, alcohol
and drug abuse. Parents in these situations often lack the resources to gather and
interpret information about their children's educational options.
61 It should be noted that the voucher program did result in some reform in the
Dixon and Bibbs schools. The schools changed their curricula, deleting science and

social studies, and substituting additional F-CAT test preparation. See A+ Plan
Already Getting Good Results, supra note 44; see also The Voucher Distraction,ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at 16A. The schools also increased number of

days of school, so that students at Dixon and Bibbs had 210 mandatory days of
school rather than the 180 that other students in Florida received. See Bill Kaczor,
Pressure Still On FormerFailing Schools, Can't Afford to Get Another F, FLORIDA

TIMES-UNION, Aug. 13, 2000, at B6. The public attention drawn by the application
of the "failing" label humiliated many students and teachers, but did bring in
additional funds to buy new computers. See Hall, supra note 45. These changes,
though they did result in the school's receiving a passing score on the F-CAT tests
this year, can hardly be said to be meaningful educational improvements.
62 Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 296

(1999).
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crusaders as long ago as the 1830's,63 the universal nature of
public education has only recently been achieved. During World
War II the effort to draft a force to fight against Japan and Nazi
Germany awakened the nation to the fact that many of our
young men were unfit for military service because they were
illiterate or suffering from diseases relating to poverty. 64 Until
then, many southern whites did not attend school at all, or
attended perhaps for only a few months a year; schools were not
necessarily available to black children at all.65 They certainly
were not available to most children with special needs.6 6 It was
not until 1954, in Brown vs. Board of Education,that the duty to
provide an equal educational opportunity for black children was
recognized by law.67 Not until 1975 did the law recognize the
need to provide educational opportunity for all handicapped
children. 68 In 1988, the Bilingual Education Act was passed,
providing educational opportunities for non-English speaking
69
children.
This country has only recently begun to take seriously the
task of providing a high quality public education for every
student.7 0 The gains of the reform movements of the 1950s
through the 1980s created a more inclusive school system, but
also contributed to dissatisfaction with public schooling. 71 After
decades of continuous school reform, the ideal of providing an
63 See O'Brien, supranote 24, at 368-69.
64 See Alex Molnar, School Choice: WEAC

Research Paper, at http'J/www.
Weac.org/resourcenov96/vouchers.htm (visited Mar. 19, 2001).
65 See O'Brien, supra note 24, at 377.
66 See KERN ALEXANDER AND M.
DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL LAW 396-98 (4th ed. 1998) (describing the historical neglect of education for
disabled children).
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excellent educational opportunity for each child remains an
unmet goal. This is indeed frustrating for students, parents,
school reformers and scholars of education, who now call for
radical reform, claiming that earlier reform efforts have failed. 72
Declarations of failure, however, are premature. Building the
schools and training the teachers for an ever-growing and
increasingly diverse population of school children in an
increasingly complex technological society is an expensive,
difficult, and never-ending job. It is a task that is made even
more complicated by the number and diverse nature of demands
73
on schools and the disintegrating nature of our communities.
It is a task that requires society to harness the sustained effort
of the entire population in pursuit of a common goal, a goal
worth pursuing because the education of the next generation "is
important to the entire society; to our economic, cultural and
political well-being, as well as to the life prospects for the
74
individual students involved."
Tuition vouchers, operating on individual self-interest, are
the wrong tool for effectuating school reform that is dedicated to
providing excellence, access, and equity. Individual consumer
interests are not necessarily aligned with these goals. 75
Collective choices focused on our common future are more likely
to advance progress toward educational equity.
Providing an exit ticket from inadequate schools for a small
number of children cannot be viewed as successful school reform.
It may, however, create the illusion of school reform. Private
school choice threatens to undermine efforts at reforming
ineffective schools by providing a conveniently guilt-assuaging
illusion for suburban tax payers: the poor children in the worst
schools were given a "choice" of a better school and have thus
76
experienced equality of educational opportunity.
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See Minow, supra note 62, at 270.
See id. at 271.
Id. at 270; see also TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 71, at 140-42.
See KEVIN B. SMITH & KENNETH J. MEIER, THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL

CHOICE 131 (1995) ('The market seeks efficiency. Equity is not efficient.").
76 See Jim Ryan, School Choice and the Suburbs, 14 J.L. & POL. 459, 465 (1998)

("[Sichool choice fits in comfortably within a trend of suburban absolution and
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III. POTENTIAL HARM #3
The concept of private choice implies private responsibility,
underminingthe societal understandingof education as a
sharedresponsibility.
Although Milton Friedman did not originate the concept of
the private school tuition voucher, his interest in vouchers
anticipated a trend toward divesting government of many of its
traditional functions.77 Free market economists such as Milton
Friedman do not take for granted that government should be
involved in education at all.7 8 Friedman did, however, suggest
that it would be appropriate for government to require a
79
minimum level of education and require parents to pay for it.
This would have a beneficial effect, he wrote, because "it would
tend to equalize the social and private costs of having children
and so promote a better distribution of families by size."8 0 He
went on to postulate that this proposal is "hardly feasible" given
differences in family resources and family size, which he says are
the reason for and the result of the policy of government subsidy
of education.8 1 Public education has traditionally come under
attack from taxpayers who would prefer not to pay for an
expensive governmental program that may not benefit their own
interests. The 1990s saw a resurgence of resistance to
governmental programs perceived as redistributive. According
to Professor Minow:
Across the globe, we are witnessing a tidal change in the role
of governments in providing for basic human needs. Western
democracies are backing away from the social welfare state
created through democratic politics. In the name of producing
stable currencies and of securing promising positions in the
global economic markets, Canada and countries across Europe
are cutting back on social welfare guarantees. Here in the
United States, devolution of governmental responsibility to the
states constitutes part of a larger withdrawal of the federal
commitment to providing economic relief for the poor, as

77 See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICs

AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, 123-24 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).
78 See id. at 124-25.
79 See id. at 125.
80 Id. (footnote omitted).
81 Id. at 126.
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originally established by the New Deal. Even formerly socialist
countries like Russia are cutting back on basic social
guarantees ranging from childcare to police protection.
Taking the place of social welfare guarantees are policies
intended to harness the competitive efficiencies of the free
82
market and to promote individual consumer choice.

Individual consumer choice is not likely to serve the longterm goal of maintaining public support for full governmental
funding of a high quality educational experience for every child.
If a redistributive program is enacted, only poor children will
receive an educational voucher check in the mail. The American
people will come to understand education as a subsidy, like
welfare and food stamps, for poor families. When the white
middle class sees the poor receiving a check in the mail, they will
either demand that poor families take more responsibility for
educating their own children, or will demand an equal voucher
for their children. Meanwhile, wealthier families will always
have more options for their children than poorer families.
This brings me to an argument favoring tuition vouchers
that I have heard many times from middle class parents whose
children are already in private schools: I should receive a tuition
voucher because I pay taxes to support the public schools that
my children do not attend. I have received no. benefit from my
educational tax dollars and am essentially paying twice. PErents
who make this argument fundamentally misunderstand the role
of tax money in public education. All tax-paying members of
society, whether they have children or not, contribute to the
funds that pay for public schooling. The benefits and the costs of
public education accrue to society generally, not merely to the
children who attend and their families. Parents who decide to
send their children to private schools are not "paying twice" for
their children's education. They pay once, through their tax
contributions, for the benefit of living in a society that educates
all of its children.
The struggle for free universal education is one that has
been hard-fought each step of the way against elitists and taxresisters. The adoption of free universal education as a core
value of our democratic society is not one that we can take for
82
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granted. Excellence and equity in public education are collective
values whose utility is not immediately apparent to individuals,
and, may, indeed conflict with many individuals' self interest.
What is needed in school reform is not an appeal to individual
self interest, but rather a formulation of "a common ground of
purpose sufficiently generous, compelling, and plausible that it
83
can unify citizens in support of public schooling."
IV. POTENTIAL HARM #4
Private school tuition vouchers may threaten the autonomy of
private institutions.
Theoretically, educational "choice" empowers parents to
determine what is best for their individual children, and to find
an educational placement that suits the parents' cultural and
religious values. For voucher advocates, this is not only a matter
of individual liberty, but also an issue of parental control of the
manner in which the child is being indoctrinated while the
parents are not present.84 By funding private schools, the
argument goes, vouchers would "remove the coercive financial
pressure on parents to choose public over private schools."8 5
Parents already have the right to place their children in
private, secular or religious schools.8 6 These schools are entitled
to screen students in admissions, design their curricula, and
effect their own educational values. Parents who choose private
schools seek an educational culture of like-minded individuals
for their children that is different from that of public schools.
Demands for accountability of private institutions receiving
public dollars may change the autonomous character of private
schools.
Further, voucher programs will almost certainly require
private schools to change admissions policies to prohibit
exclusivity. This is not to say that many private schools do not
provide for the kind of inclusive education currently available in
the public schools, but if private, religious entities are required
to be inclusive, something essential about the nature of a
83 See TYACK & CUBAN, supranote 71 at 140.
84 Stephen Gilles, Why Parents Should Choose,

LEARNING FROM SCHOOL
CHOICE 395-407 (Paul E. Peterson & Bryan C. Hassel, eds. 1999).
85 Id. at 405.
86 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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private, religious school will be lost. 87 Exclusivity is part of the
essential character of private institutions, especially religious
institutions, which are created by the exclusivity of a community
of believers, as defined by religious faith and practice. 88
Changing the admissions policies of institutions that seek to
define themselves by a community of belief will fundamentally
alter the nature of those institutions.
CONCLUSION
Professor Lawrence Cremin wrote that popular education is
"as radical an ideal as Americans have embraced." 89 The
achievement of the ideal is difficult and the institutions
established to achieve it are flawed, but it is important to note
the achievements of the movement toward popular education
and to strive for the ideal. Exposing our failure to meet our
ideals of equality and access is a step toward giving substance to
the ideal.
Private school tuition vouchers will not solve the problems of
the public schools. Instead, they may create a distraction from
the real question of how to provide universal free education of
high quality. The real choice presented by school voucher
initiatives is what kind of school system we choose to fund: one
that is exclusive, oriented to consumer sovereignty and that
permits greater racial socioeconomic and religious segregation;
or one that is inclusive, tolerant of diverse views, oriented
toward equity and toward social, racial and religious integration.
Preference for the public good over private interest requires that
we choose the latter.
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This is not to say that it is not possible to understand some religious
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But common human experience

indicates that adherence to any religion is exclusive of those who are not
accepted as members of the community of believers. Some form or degree
of at least moral, and often material, exclusion seems to be necessary for
vindicating the validity of the faith of one religious community as
distinguished from that of other religious communities.
Id.
89 CREMIN, supra note 71, at 39.

